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ABSTRACT
The Batavian Revolution of 1795 that overthrew the old
stadtholderly regime of the Dutch Republic was followed by a
period of intense political conflict in which popular mobilization
played a key role. Among revolutionary elites, the main dividing
line between moderates and radicals occurred around questions
concerning the reorganization of the state apparatus and the
writing of a new constitution. A full rejection of the federative
model of the state that had characterized the former Dutch
Republic became central to the repertoire of the radical faction in
the National Convention. However, instances of protest and
rebellion from below, often supported by the radicals in the
Convention, generally remained conspicuously local in focus. This
clash between national ideals and highly localized realities
remains one of the central paradoxes of the Batavian Revolution.
The form in which this process unfolded was peculiar to the
trajectory of the Batavian Revolution, which more than any of its
counterparts became centered on constitutional issues. But severe
tensions between programs for the rationalization of state
bureaucracy along nationalizing lines and popular support for far-
reaching local autonomy existed in each of the Atlantic
Revolutions. In January 1797, radical democrats in Leiden
attempted to find an organizational form to solve this problem.
They called for a national gathering of representatives from local
revolutionary clubs and neighborhood assemblies. The response
by the moderate provincial and national authorities was
remarkably swift, and the initiative was repressed before the
meeting could take place. Examining the failure of this unique
attempt to bridge the divide between local popular mobilization
and national revolutionary programs, as well as the discussion
that followed this failure, can help us understand the possibilities







On 15 January 1797, in the midst of a growing political crisis engulfing the Batavian Repub-
lic that had been established in the Netherlands two years earlier, the regional govern-
ment of the province of Holland took a remarkable step. Without the permission of the
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Batavian National Convention, and encroaching upon the jurisdiction of local authorities,
provincial officers marched into the city of Leiden and arrested five well-known radical
democrats. Among them were the leading Leiden radical publishers Willem van Lelyveld
and Pieter Hendrik Trap. Their crime had been to sign a call for a “nation-wide assembly of
neighborhood councils.”1 The aim of this gathering was to rally the lowest electoral
organs, independently of the National Convention, in order to push the revolution in a
more radical direction. The attempt led to panic among moderate politicians, who
perhaps unsurprisingly backed the regional government of Holland’s actions to quickly
suppress the attempt. Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, a leading moderate who would
later become head of state, led the charge. In a stormy meeting of the National Conven-
tion, he argued that if allowed, the nation-wide assembly of neighborhood councils would
undercut the very system of indirect representation and create “a representative Body,
that not just as individual Citizens, but with authority will pretend to sit in judgement of
the interests of the Nation… ”2 He therefore advocated stern measures to repress this
attempt. Radicals at the local as well as the national level came to the defense of their
Leiden associates. However, they did so not under the banner of their own program of
direct democracy, but focused their protests on the violation by the Holland deputies of
the local autonomy of the city of Leiden.
While the incident itself quickly sunk into oblivion, the brief uproar it created within
radical circles with perfect clarity illustrates one of the key dilemmas faced by the Batavian
revolution. Politically, the more radical leaders of the revolution advocated a far-reaching
centralization of the state along national lines.3 On the other hand, the rank and file that
they sought to mobilize remained highly committed to the defense of local autonomy
against any encroachment by centralizing authorities.4 For radical leaders on the national
as well as the local level, including the arrested publishers Trap and Lelyveld, the attempt
at a “nation-wide convention of neighborhood councils” was aimed at strengthening the
connections between the revolutionary leadership in the National Convention and local
revolutionary politics. Instead, the complete failure of this attempt laid bare the fault
lines along which the fragile alliance between state-modernizers and local popular mobil-
ization would soon start unraveling.
R. R. Palmer was one of the first historians internationally to grant the Batavian Revolu-
tion its own distinct voice in the cacophony of the Age of Revolutions. While historians
before him, including Dutch historians, had described the events surrounding the 1795
fall of the old regime primarily as an extension of French intervention, Palmer described
the Batavian events as a “true revolution.”5 He pointed out the significant repercussions
for the wider struggles in the Atlantic world, especially for the military conflict between
France and Britain. He also noted the particular extent to which Batavian revolutionary
politics became focused on constitutional issues, which was a result of the drawn-out
crisis of the Dutch state that preceded it.6 Study of the Batavian Revolution since then
has affirmed the need to recognize that this revolution was driven by its own dynamic
of popular contention and intra-elite struggles, rather than being simply an extension of
French military power.7
The recognition of the revolutionary character of constitutional struggles and conflicts
between radicals and moderates over the nature of popular sovereignty and democracy
has greatly increased the relevance of the Dutch case for comparisons with similar
events in the Atlantic World and beyond. This is particularly true for the far-reaching
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conflicts that arose over the deeply entrenched federalism of Dutch political life. Clashes
between programs for the rationalization of state bureaucracy along nationalizing lines
and existing traditions of far-reaching local autonomy were certainly not confined to
the Netherlands. Although, as Pierre Serna has daringly suggested, all the Atlantic revolu-
tions contained elements of a “War of Independence,” at the national level these revolu-
tions increasingly evolved into wars of subjugation of the regions to the center.8
This tension gave rise to explosive struggles for autonomy, mixed with battles over
direct versus representative democracy. Sometimes resistance was mounted under the
flag of a purer version of the original revolution, as happened when the former enslaved
on Haiti raised the standard of liberty.9 Sometimes it took more outwardly conservative
forms, as in the War of the Vendée.10 Most often it alternated between these two extremes.
The Dutch colonies in the Atlantic world provided a third variant, in which struggles over
the implementation of the revolution became connected to the rise of creole elites and
their own agendas of preserving local autonomy in the face of increasing imperial compe-
tition and slave resistance.11 In this wide variety of forms, the question of local autonomy
versus an expanding, rationalizing national state had important effects for the relationship
between revolutionary regimes and leaderships and local popular mobilizations. In this
light, the Leiden events can be seen as a microscopic example of a much wider problem.
The Batavian context
The Batavian Revolution started in January 1795 with the overthrow of the stadtholderly
regime that had ruled the Dutch Republic since 1747. The stadtholder and his family were
forced into exile, the National Convention replaced the old States General, and the Bata-
vian Republic became an ally of France in its war against Britain. Three years of popular
rebellions and political conflict followed, culminating in 1798 in a coup and counter-
coup. The defining political issue in the newly established National Convention became
whether the Batavian Republic replacing the Ancien Régime should be a loose federation
of provinces as had been the tradition of the old Dutch Republic, or a national state. Fed-
eralism was deeply imbued in the structures of the state. The founding principle of the
Dutch Republic laid down in the Unie van Utrecht at the time of the sixteenth-century
Dutch Revolt had been the protection of the autonomy of the seven federated provinces
against central rule. As a result representation in all the main organs of the state, from the
States General to the five independent Admiralty Boards, and from finance to the manage-
ment of the East and West India Companies, had remained painstakingly divided over the
seven provinces. Social policy and jurisdiction largely remained the prerogative of the
influential town-governments. Local protectionism remained a central plank of their econ-
omic outlook. However, under pressure of eighteenth-century military and economic set-
backs, criticism of this elaborate state-structure mounted. Now, provincial privileges
seemed to hinder growth and development.12
Some steps toward centralization were taken under the Ancien Régime. The last
stadtholder William V was a remarkably central figure in the otherwise fragmented repub-
lic. Not only had his predecessor managed to make his position hereditary, he was also
stadtholder of all the provinces, he chaired the Dutch East India Company and West
India Company and actively intervened in the politics of the colonies. During his tenure
there were two major waves of opposition, the failed Patriot Revolution of 1785–1787
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and the successful Batavian Revolution of 1795. These movements fused Dutch traditions
of constitutional thinking with the newly emerging political winds that blew across the
Atlantic. Being directed against centralizing, semi-monarchical Orangist rule, the Patriot
Revolution of 1785–1787 had called for a “restoration” of the old traditions of federative
administration.13 In doing so, it naturally took its inspiration from the American War of
Independence, where revolutionaries in turn upheld the Dutch Republic as one of their
own constitutional models.14 The Patriots were able to take over several local govern-
ments until in 1787 the Prussian army invaded to restore the power of Willem V. This
resulted in a purge of Patriots from the local governments and restored supporters of
the House of Orange to positions of power.
The chances of the Orangists turned in 1793 when the Dutch Republic entered the war
against revolutionary France. The French invaded the Netherlands in January 1795, chasing
outWillem V and opening the secondwave of constitutional experiments. In themeantime,
under the influence of the French Revolution and the constitutions of 1791 and 1793 that
had proclaimed the nation “one and indivisible,”many of the former Patriots had changed
their perspective on the desired outcome of their revolution. With few exceptions, themore
radical revolutionary leaders now became ardent followers of the ideal of the centralized
nation-state. The demand of a unitary state became the central plank of a program that
henceforward became associated with state modernization, democratic opposition to
local “aristocratic” ruling cliques, radicalism or even Jacobinism.15 In a pamphlet written
less than two years before the Batavian Revolution Bernardus Bosch, who after the
revolution became one of the most radical representatives in the National Convention,
summed up this program. Borrowing his terminology from French debates, he directly
equated federalism with feudalism. “All the provinces have to form but one union; the
gates of the cities, that close in the Citizen as in a cage have to be forever opened, as a
token of general unification.”16 For Bosch and his fellow-radicals, national unification was
almost synonymous with democracy. Local prerogatives were the powerbase of the old
elites and the stadtholderly regime. A popular revolution would break them down.
Once the revolution unfolded, however, things proved to be not so simple. Although
popular revolts accompanied the French invasion of 1795, the installation of the new
regime was as much the result of large sections of the old elite accommodating to
foreign occupation. The founding of an elected National Convention as a replacement
of the old States General, consisting of delegations of the Provincial elites, was a great
departure from the old federative model. However, from the provinces to the central
state an influential layer of administrators remained in place that supported at best a
very moderate course for state reform, leaving part of the old federative structure
intact.17 Frustrated radicals increasingly called for a purge of these “Orangists,” “aristo-
crats” and “federalists,” but lacked the powerbase to effect this. Meanwhile, popular
protest did not unfold as the unified national revolution that the radicals had envisioned,
but due to the completely fragmented nature of political life took the form of a loosely
connected series of local uprisings. In this, they continued to resemble the pattern estab-
lished by the Patriot revolution, that as Wayne te Brake noticed “was a localized revolution
within a decentralized republic.”18 At the municipal level, regime-change was mostly
enforced by heterogeneous coalitions of revolutionary clubs, moderate and radical veter-
ans of the Patriot revolution, and sections of the lower classes.19 They railed against the
representatives of the old order that had nestled themselves in positions of power, but
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because their support base often remained rather small, they did not manage to oust
them. Instead, next to the moderate official Batavian organs of power and often in opposi-
tion to them, local radical societies organized their own permanent structures of represen-
tation. One of these was the Citizens’ Gathering in the Marekerk (a church) in Leiden, that
would play an important part in the events leading up to January 1797. Similar institutions
emerged elsewhere, under different names. In Amsterdam, a General Assembly of Neigh-
borhood Councils became the seedbed of local radicalism.20 In Friesland the Hoofdverga-
dering or Head Meeting fulfilled the same role.21
Through petitions, demonstrations and sometimes open riot, these institutions put
pressure on local governments. Revolutionary societies and moderate municipal councils
clashed over whether (male) suffrage should be universal or restricted for servants, the
poor and other “dependents,” over how to deal with the worsening state of the
economy and its effect on living conditions, and over the desirability of “purges” of the
supporters of the old Orangist regime from positions of power. Such conflicts led to par-
ticularly sharp outbursts of popular protest in Amsterdam. On 16 September 1795, armed
and unarmed protestors stormed the Amsterdam City Hall to amplify their demands “to
recognize the Batavian Clubs as official bodies, and to immediately decommission the
civil servants of the old regime, and put sons of freedom in their place.”22 In May of the
next year, the same issue led to an even more threatening armed revolt that lasted
several days and centrally involved the city’s artillery regiment. A French garrison had
to be called in to quell the unrest.23 Radicals also tried to gain influence through the neigh-
borhood councils, the electoral bodies organized at the local level to facilitate the selection
of representatives to the municipalities and later the National Convention. While there was
an important difference between the revolutionary societies, representing a small minority
of political activists, and these neighborhood councils that effectively formed the lowest
rung of the new electoral system, the radicals consciously tried to blur this distinction.
In 1798, leading radical Gerrit Paape misleadingly claimed that “[a]lthough the Societies
do not literally form or represent the Batavian People, they were indeed seen as the
people. For by the small change of calling themselves Neighborhood Councils, they
became the sovereigns of the nation.”24
By the end of Year II of the Batavian Revolution, this stalemate between vociferous local
radical coalitions and a deadlock on constitutional reform in the National Assembly had
reached crisis point. In the eyes of the radicals, the revolution remained unfinished.
They blamed this on “aristocrats” who had dressed up as Batavian revolutionaries and
had gained positions at all levels of the state. Slymgasten, “slimy fellows,” was the term
that the radicals introduced for this group. The influential newspaper De Democraten
defined slymgasten as
[… ] such persons, who in the execution of the affairs of this Revolution always lean towards
the soft side; who […] imagine themselves that this is the securest way, and therefore do not
dare to deviate from it by a single step, unless they are being forced to do so by the gravest
emergency, and even than can only do so while shivering.25
The only way to force such characters to take bolder action, was to make sure that they felt
under direct pressure from the people. The radicals saw the Neighborhood Councils as the
natural venue for organizing this pressure. A member of the Amsterdam society Tot nut
van het Vaderland (For the benefit of the Fatherland), that in 1795 had taken the initiative
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for the establishment of the General Assembly of Neighborhood Councils, in the wooly
language of the time proclaimed that “this Assembly is the access point between the
People of Amsterdam and the Representation of that People, because in its turn it
becomes the point of access to the Representation of the People of the Netherlands.”26
The same ideas would stimulate Leiden radicals to take the initiative for their Nation-
wide Assembly of Neighborhood Councils.
Revolutionary Leiden
The course of the Batavian revolution in Leiden provides a good example of the ways in
which radicals used popular mobilization around issues of democratic representation and
local governance in order to push the revolutionary process further, as well as of the
obstacles they faced in doing so. Already in 1795, the basic problems that gave rise to
the failed attempt to form a National Convention of Neighborhood Councils were
clearly laid out.27
Immediately after the French General Pichegru had led his troops across the Meuse in
January 1795, Leiden radicals took action. Several days before French soldiers entered the
city, they proclaimed the dawn of “Batavian Freedom.” An estimated one thousand armed
citizens participated in the overthrow of the old city government in the night of 18 and 19
January.28 With a total urban population of 31,000, among whom were only 9,000 men of
fighting age, this shows that the revolution was carried out with substantial popular par-
ticipation.29 An anonymous Orangist diarist noted that the crowd initially gathered at the
Town hall. From there, they marched to the houses of members of the civil militia that they
deemed untrustworthy in order to disarm them.30 Already on the following day, the exist-
ing radical societies of Leiden convened the General Citizens’ Assembly in the Marekerk.
This Assembly took the initiative in organizing elections for the neighborhood assemblies
and installing a provisional municipal government.31 The Citizens’ Assembly remained in
place, in order to guard the implementation of radical reforms. The lawyer Joost Roms-
winckel opened the meeting. In his speech, he emphasized the need for citizens to main-
tain vigilant control of the activities of the municipality, “which without your great
influence, without your powerful support, without your unending assistance, will only
lead to weak, insignificant measures.”32
The speed and ease with which the old order in Leiden was overturned was a result of
the strong roots of local opposition to the stadtholderly regime, going back even before
the Patriot revolution of the mid-1780s. The decline of manufacturing industries that was a
general feature of the Dutch economy of this period was felt with particular intensity in
this formerly prosperous center of the Dutch textile production. Unemployment was
exceptionally high, and about one quarter of the population at some point was dependent
on poor relief.33 Anti-Orangism had also penetrated the upper middle classes. Several of
the curators and professors at the Leiden University had been known for their Patriot sym-
pathies.34 This longer history certainly had an influence on the formation of a Batavian
radical leadership in the post-1795 period. The prominent Leiden Patriot Pieter Vreede,
a democrat and abolitionist, became the main spokesperson of the radical wing of the
National Convention. Both Willem van Lelyveld and Pieter Hendrik Trap, among those
arrested in January 1797, came from families that were tied to the earlier opposition move-
ment. Van Lelyveld came from a prominent regent family that included various known
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Patriots.35 Trap’s mother had published the weekly MOEI-AL (“The Meddler”), containing
blistering attacks on aristocratic government at the height of Orangist counter-revolution
in 1790.36
These strong antecedents also help explain why the Leiden radicals from the very start
viewed their local activities in the light of a nation-wide revolution. In the very first months
of its activities, the newly formed Revolutionary Committee of Insurrection defined its task
as to “help in the work of effecting the revolution to our Brothers, both in the vicinity of our
city and in various cities and villages, yes, in other parts of the Republic.”37 Meanwhile, the
Committee of Public Safety that convened on 19 January took concerted action within the
town limits. Within two days, it elected a secretary, formed two armed companies, placed
an officer of the old regime under house arrest, authorized the use of force in disarming
the civil militia if the need arose, and ordered the city watchman to no longer blow the
Orangist anthem on his trumpet.38 The primary task of the Committee was a military
one, but it also monitored the food supplies to the city population and garrisoned soldiers,
market prices of basic goods, and conflicts between Leiden inhabitants and French
soldiers.39
Initially, the committee also was responsible for snuffing out former functionaries of the
Orangist regime, but responsibility for purging local government soon was transferred to a
separate committee.40 Like elsewhere, conflicts between radicals and moderates soon
emerged. One of the first questions around which this happened was who would have
the right to vote. Radicals such as Romswinckel argued for extending voting rights to ser-
vants and the poor. The argument for excluding them from the vote was that only ‘inde-
pendent” citizens – meaning people with property – could have a true stake in the future
of the nation, and could be trusted not to deliver it back into the hands of tyranny. As
counter-evidence, Romswinckel’s radical colleague Meerburg asked for the inclusion in
the debates of Bernardus Bosch’ 1793 pamphlet.41 As part of his argument for a thorough
democratization that should lay the foundation for a new unified national state, the fierce
abolitionist Bosch had argued that excluding servants from the vote was the equivalent of
relegating them to a position of slavery.42 Remarkably given the later course of Leiden
events, this pamphlet also contained a warning that even universal suffrage would not
suffice for keeping elected representatives on a clear revolutionary course. Therefore,
Bosch proposed the erection of a separate, permanent assembly to control a future
National Convention, “consisting mainly of neighborhood councilors or hundred-men,
again elected by the people.” Only such a permanent form of direct representation
could ensure the “OPPERMAGT DES VOLKS,” the supreme power of the people.43
However, on the issue of suffrage the radicals suffered a defeat. Women, men on poor
relief and servants were all excluded from the vote, just as “bankrupts under guardianship,
those who were dishonorably sentenced, prisoners and suspects.”44 Since about a quarter
of the population at times was dependent on poor relief and servants formed one of the
largest professional groups within the city, this meant that effectively a majority of the
working class was disenfranchised.45 A second proposal by the radicals to elect all officials
at the municipal level directly from the Neighborhood Councils was also blocked.46
Radical attempts to influence the course of the revolution on the municipal level and
the nature of local democracy were fueled by a stream of popular petitions, that also
covered social and economic issues. Serious conflicts arose over the redistribution of
offices and the punishment of former Orangist regents. The Citizens’ Assembly in the
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Marekerkmore than once demanded firmer action. Already on 24 March 1795 it sent a pro-
posal initiated by one of the radical societies to the municipality, demanding a freeze on all
but the indispensable nominations of new officials until a general plan for the cleansing of
local government from Orangist influence had been put into effect.47 Similar requests
were repeated well into 1797. But it was more militant protest that finally forced the mod-
erates in the Municipality to give in. Public celebrations of another famous moment of
popular struggle, the freeing of Leiden from a Spanish siege on 3 October 1583, set the
stage. Probably under the influence of Leiden’s main radical society, members of the
armed militia attacked 70 houses of suspected Orangists. Now, after prevarications that
had taken more than two years, a committee was formed to investigate the actions of
former Orangist officials. The radical lawyer Romswinckel headed the investigation.
The failed nation-wide assembly of January 1797
Localized revolts combined with French invasion had been enough to replace the old
order throughout the Republic. Reorganization of the organs of power at the level of
the municipality demanded most of the attention of the radicals in this first period. But
once the first National Convention replaced the old States General on 1 March 1796 demo-
cratic agitation became more and more focused on the deadlock that developed in
national politics. The drafting of a new constitution fueled permanent conflict between
radicals and moderates in the Convention that could not agree on the relationship
between national, provincial and local organs of power. Meanwhile, revolutionary move-
ments at the local level seemed to have hit a wall. The radical press fumed against “aristo-
crats” and “slimy fellows” sabotaging the process of reorganizing the state, but revolts in
Amsterdam in November 1795 and April 1796 demanding wider popular representation
and purges against former Orangists remained unsuccessful.48 In Friesland the radicals
held power at the provincial level, but were themselves confronted with popular
protest against the failure to alleviate the economic hardship suffered by the lower
classes, resulting in an uprising in the rural village Kollum early in 1797. To escape from
the embarrassment that this caused for their democratic claims, radical administrators
described these local rural riots as a Dutch Vendée.49 Rumors of a planned British invasion
and counter-revolutionary plots were rife. Already in 1796, the leading radicals in the
National Convention Pieter Vreede, Bernardus Bosch and Johan Valckenaer called for
popular armament against counter-revolution from within and from without. Significantly,
they simultaneously sent round a call on Neighborhood Councils to put pressure on the
National Convention and thus force the moderates to take concerted action. The majority
in the National Convention responded immediately by sending their own call for
restraint.50
The Leiden initiative to organize the nation-wide assembly should be seen against this
background. On 21 December 1796 the Leiden General Citizens’ Assembly sent a letter to a
large number of Neighborhood Councils and revolutionary societies throughout the
country.51 The letter contained an invitation to elect delegates to a meeting that should
take place on 18 or 19 January of the next year, the second anniversary of the revolution,
in the old building of the Leiden civic militia. The aim of this gathering was “to form one
Assembly of representatives in which the People, as it were, could speak with one mouth,
[…] so that Growth and Prosperity could be advanced and established throughout the
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entire Republic, with united strength.”52 The proclamation was signed by three Leiden
democrats, H. Boonacker, J. C. Harnisch and P. H. Trap.53 It was not the first time that rad-
icals organized a gathering of revolutionary clubs across municipal or provincial borders.54
But this time, they consciously styled their initiative a meeting of elected representatives of
the local organs of democracy. Implicit in their suggestion that through this assembly the
people would speak with one mouth, was the idea that the National Convention was not
the real representative of the popular voice. This challenged the foundational claims of the
Batavian state, and thus was indeed a revolutionary step.
The Government of the Province of Holland discussed the call for the nation-wide
assembly on 14 January. It took immediate action, without observing the common
forms of consultation with national and local authorities. The next morning, the Leiden citi-
zens Trap, Lelyveld, Van Lil, Van Tricht and Van Klaaveren were apprehended. Explaining
this course of action some months after the events, an investigative commission of the
Provincial Government stressed:
[…] one should be willingly blind, when refusing to see that this letter […] had as its aim to
form an Assembly that very soon would have challenged this Government, yes, if it would
have been possible would even have wrestled from it the power, entrusted to it by the
People of Holland.55
Two days later, provincial authorities tried to arrest Trap’s two co-signers of the proclama-
tion Boonacker and Harnish in the same fashion. However, the bailiff did not find them at
home. Instead, at the door of one of the two fugitives an unknown person yelled “a large
number of rude and immodest qualifications” at them.56 A later statement by the bailiff
himself revealed that these “rude qualifications” had consisted of the charge “that his
actions were in contradiction with the rights of Man, and violated Civil liberties.”57
As soon as the president of the Leiden Municipality heard about the arrest, he called for
an emergency meeting. Despite the differences in political outlook among the represen-
tatives, they condemned the actions of the provincial authorities. In their declaration, they
foregrounded not the revolutionary aims of the proposed Assembly of Neighborhood
Councils, but the infringement on local jurisdiction committed by the Provincial Govern-
ment. They described the actions of the Province as:
[…] an actual assault on the Security of this Community and a supremely criminal violation of
the right of all Free Citizens, without prior knowledge of any member of the Municipal Gov-
ernment, Minister, or anyone else, let alone with proper consent of the Committee of Public
Interest, or a competent judge; an act, so contemptuous to this Council, that it directly contra-
dicts the lawful rights that not only this municipality, but the entire people has possessed
since ancient times.58
The City Council decided on three points. First, it promised to do everything in its power to
ensure the release of the five arrested citizens. Second, it promised full protection to
H. Boonacker and J. C. Harnish. “The council will not allow that in the future any of the citi-
zens of this Municipality will be stolen,” except when the Leiden Committee of Public Inter-
est had given its prior consent.59 Finally, it made military preparations, in case the province
would want to secure further arrests by sending troops. These measures were backed by
popular mobilization, aimed at protecting the autonomy of the city against outside intru-
sion. The anonymous Orangist diarist that was previously cited, reported: “Early in the
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morning, one could hear that all those freshly converted patriotic citizens were up in arms
and stood at the city gates.”60
Representatives of the General Citizens’ Assembly came to the meeting of the Munici-
pality and presented a letter in which they complained about “the violated rights of Men
and Citizens,” and “requested resolute cooperation of our good representatives so that our
five apprehended fellow-citizens can promptly return to the bosom of their fellow-citi-
zens.”61 The representatives were not received cordially. Signifying the unwillingness of
the majority within the municipality to be seen too much as the handmaidens of the rad-
icals, the letter was not even taken into formal deliberation.62 Instead, it installed an inves-
tigative committee that would judge the legality of the actions of the Province, as well as
the proposed nation-wide assembly of Neighborhood Councils.63
The investigation did not last long. The following day, the commission – consisting of
the moderates Van Santen and Akersloot – reported its recommendations, which reflected
the position taken by the municipality. On the one hand, Van Santen and Akersloot
insisted on the release of the Leiden citizens. The provincial authorities quickly heeded
their request. On the other hand, they suggested that the Assembly of Neighborhood
Councils should be prohibited. Without much discussion, the municipal government
agreed to both points. It sent a new letter to the Provincial Government, in which it
clearly adopted the dramatic style of the radicals:
Now, when the aristocracy has been defeated and freedom has triumphed, you dare to under-
take this action that supersedes those of our former tyrants in brazenness! Remember, fellow
citizens, that all rule of terror is of such nature, that in order to remain standing, it needs more
and more victims.64
But despite the harsh language, the moderates in municipal government had profited pol-
itically from the actions by the provincial authorities. Given the substantial support that the
radicals could still muster among the city population, the Leiden moderates in all likeli-
hood would not have had the power to suppress the Nation-wide Assembly of Neighbor-
hood Councils itself. Thanks to the actions of the Provincial authorities, the threatening
radical initiative had been sunk, while the municipal moderates could at the same time
present themselves as the staunch defenders of civil liberties against “tyranny.” Avoiding
a direct confrontation with the influential Leiden General Citizens’ Assembly, they had
managed to steal the radicals’ thunder by making the popular slogan of the “restauration
of local autonomy” the only significant political demand following the arrests.
Resonance
The events that took place in Leiden were of national significance. On 16 January the
National Convention heard its first report on the issue. Without delay, a commission
was installed to judge on the political implications of the proposals of the Leiden radicals.
The inclusion of the prominent representatives Van de Kasteele, Schimmelpenninck and
Van Lennep in this commission shows how much weight the National Convention
attached to this case. On the next day, Van Lennep presented their findings. They con-
tained an unequivocal condemnation of the planned assembly, “for such a meeting
already included in its name, that it was a representative assembly, which could create
the most dangerous confusions and clashes.”65 Several of the radical representatives
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protested this claim. Like Bernardus Bosch and the Leiden radicals, they argued that an
assembly elected directly from the neighborhood councils could be a necessary means
to put pressure from below on the National Convention and prevent a relapse of the
state into federalism and aristocratic government. “How disastrous would the situation
be of a People, that is not allowed to meet in order to discuss its weightiest interests?,”
asked representative Nuhout van der Veen. And the leading Friesland radical C. L. van
Beyma declared that the National Convention “would need the support from the
People,” suggesting that without popular backing, it lacked “courage and power.”66
The moderate leader Schimmelpenninck retorted in kind. He repeated that the revolu-
tion was in safe hands with the elected representatives, and that interference from below
could only lead to anarchy and confusion:
It is about time to show the entire world that, on the one side, we will do everything in order to
complete this Revolution with all our Republican energy, and will offer to the people a Con-
stitution on the basis of the pure principles of a Popular Government through representation,
but on the other side that we will counter with great resolution the principles of Anarchy and
Demagoguery, in whatever lovely shape they might appear. 67
Not to do so, Schimmelpenninck added, would result in civil war.68
The leading Leiden radical Pieter Vreede responded with equal intransigence. Unlike
many of the other radicals in the Convention, he did not even attempt to prove that
the Leiden proposal fell within the existing framework of legality. For “as long as the
[new Batavian] Constitution is not accepted, we are still in Revolutionary times, and as a
result, it is the Laws of Revolution, not constitutionality, according to which we should
assess the actions of our fellow citizens.”69 Vreede continued to compare the Leiden initiat-
ive with the actions of Citizens’ Assemblies that in 1785–1787 and 1795 had played such
an important role in the struggle against the old order, thus indirectly comparing the mod-
erates in the National Convention with the deposed Orangists. It was the lack of decisive
action of the Convention that forced ordinary citizens to seek their own ways to push the
revolution further.
Oh, let us condemn ourselves, that we spur them on to such irregular actions! That the luke-
warm ways in which all the powers that represent the People in positions of authority treat the
interest of Freedom makes the People depressed and drives it to despair; that the open pro-
tection that almost everywhere is given to the supporters of the House of Orange, and the
repression with which they face the patriots at last begins to exhaust the People’s patience.70
After these words, the minutes of the session note that the applause from the public
gallery was so loud that Pieter Vreede could no longer make himself heard. Confusion fol-
lowed, in which some representatives demanded that the military empty the hall, under
loud protest of others. After this intermission, the report of the commission was put to
the vote. A majority of 78 representatives voted in favor, 24 voted against and 6 abstained.
The next day, the French Ambassador to the Batavian Republic Noël wrote to Paris that the
National Convention had taken resolute action in an incident that he deemed “assez
important.”71 But the debates had also revealed the depth of the political differences in
the Assembly that remained unresolved until a radical coup on 22 January 1798 ousted
the moderates from the Assembly.
Despite the intensity of the debate, at this point the conflict did not move beyond verbal
confrontation. One of the reasons for this was that although the Leiden radicals received
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muchmoral support for their actions, practical actions remained purely confinedwithin the
city limits. Messages of support were addressed to the Leiden municipal government, and
focused completely on the issue of the violation of local autonomy. They conspicuously
failed to mention the proposed Nation-wide Assembly of Neighborhood Councils that
had been the cause of the political riot. It is remarkable that the first letter of support that
came in, on 19 Januarywas sent by themoderateMunicipality of Delft andmainly expressed
its joy that the provincial attack on local jurisdiction had been thwarted.72 The Municipality
of Zoetermeer sent a comparable message.73 More importantly though, even the declara-
tions sent to Leiden by radical associations from other parts of the country did not mention
the proposal of Trap and the other radicals. The “Correspondence Commission of the Gath-
eringof Representatives of Batavian Clubs and associatedPopular Societies”wrote in a letter
to the “sincere and courageous Council of the City of Leiden”:
We are touched – Yes! we would insult both your courage and our own feelings, if we would
not express our emotions about your actions against the Holland Provincial Committee in the
case of the citizens Lelyvelt & Trap; […] We citizens of Amsterdam, members of Batavian clubs,
do not only completely endorse your actions in this case, but affirm that our hearts beat for
you at double speed.74
The Citizens’ Society at Schiedam, the members of the “Assembly with the Slogan Coura-
geous but Collected,” the “Association of Exiled and Persecuted Patriots at Amsterdam”
and the “Batavian Club-ists” all sent similarly worded messages to the Leiden Municipality
– the Batavian Club-ists even sent two.75 The Leiden General Citizens’ Assembly in its pro-
clamation did not include any criticism of the municipality’s suppression of its own initiat-
ive.76 Trap and Lelyvelt sent a small note expressing their gratefulness for the
municipality’s support for their release, again avoiding any mention of the cause of
their arrest. They did however add their wish that “we soon may see the Altar of
Freedom established on the Ruins of Aristocracy and Avarice.”77
Aftermath
A little over a month after the Leiden events, an anonymous satirical pamphlet described
the political fallout. Clearly marking the author as an adversary of the radicals, the pamph-
let was dressed up as “a letter of a Jacobin revolutionary citizen to his friend.”78 The Leiden
radicals were portrayed as cunning knaves who were only after their own interests. The call
for the Nation-wide Assembly supposedly was a calculated attempt to provoke the “slimy
fellows” of the Provincial Government. Compromising the moderates at the provincial
level would open the way to execute the radical’s sinister plans for a general purge. As
the feigned Leiden Jacobin writes in his letter, the hidden intention of this scheme was
to get all the radicals “a nice job in office.”79
The Leiden affair had discredited the moderate Provincial Government. However,
according to the anonymous author, this had been a close call: “if this would have gone
wrong as well we could have rolled up our camp-beds, and our entire Revolutionary
System would not have been worth as much as a single oilseed cake.”80 However, the
“Jacobins” had been rescued by the blunders of their own adversaries:
We were afraid like devils, I say, that nobody except us would open their mouths, and then it
would have been over. But how lucky we were! We shouted, and the slimy fellows helped us
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shout. They have made themselves truly useful. They shouted even louder than we did. The
members of the Provincial Government will now be sent packing, and we sing Victory!
Victory! Vive la République!81
But the real radicals of 1797 did not feel so triumphant. More than anything, they saw the
rising influence of the moderates in national politics, and feared that this would translate
in the nature of the new constitution. In July, one leading proponent of the Nation-wide
Assembly, Pieter Trap, published an important pamphlet in which a group of radical repre-
sentatives, including Vreede, Van Beyma and Bosch, rejected the majority proposal for the
new constitution. Among other points, they rejected the indirect system of elections of
representatives in the National Convention.
A People’s Government is, in the truest meaning of the word, a Government, executed by the
People itself. And a People’s Government by representation is one, in which the People rules
through its own Representatives. But how should we call such a People’s Government by rep-
resentation, if the People itself has been excluded from all influence over Government; when
the People remains that old beast of burden, driven here and there by a handful, without any
self-activity?82
If the possibility of self-activity was not provided through constitutional means, the only
alternative for the people would be to make itself heard through “a revolutionary outburst
of its physical power.” According to the authors, such an act would be fully justified:
[…] or would it be without example in these times, that the politicians would hold for revolt,
what the good Citizen holds for nothing else than resistance against oppression? Should we
commemorate here the recent events in Amsterdam, Leiden, and the things that happened to
one hundred other individuals in almost all the Provinces?83
But the events in Leiden and the revolts in Amsterdam had not only shown the opposition
of moderate municipal and provincial governments against attempts at influencing the
course of the revolution through popular mobilization. They had also laid bare the struc-
tural inability of the radicals to force a breakthrough in national politics through actions
from below. When their initiatives had been blocked by the Holland Provincial Govern-
ment, radicals inside and outside Leiden had done little more than cheer their own mod-
erate municipal government, while the moderates had successfully contained the popular
response to the politically safe framework of the defense of local autonomy.
During the summer of 1797, the radicals achieved their most significant political victory.
With a majority of 108,761 votes against 27,955, the Neighborhood Assemblies rejected a
proposal for the new constitution that was supported by the moderates in the National
Convention.84 However, it remained hard to interpret what this tally meant for the
balance of forces on the ground. The process that resulted in the new constitution had
been so muddy and so compromised that large numbers of moderates did not support
the draft. More importantly, although the rejection of the constitution blocked the way
for a resolution of the existing crisis in favor of the moderates, it did not end the
impasse in a direction supported by the radicals. Time and time again, attempts by the
radicals to reform the state were stranded by their inability to mobilize their support
base beyond local and provincial borders. By the summer of 1797 fatigue had set in
among the popular movements and the radical faction in the National Assembly. Mean-
while, the French were turning to a more interventionist course toward their “sister repub-
lics.” The coup in France of 18 Fructidor of year V (4 September 1797) seemed to open up a
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new road for the radical Batavians.85 The combination of the appointment of the new
French ambassador Charles-François Delacroix and support of the military commander
Daendels provided the radicals in the National Assembly with the opportunity to take
power. In important ways, the successful coup that a select group of radicals executed
on 22 January 1798 signified a definitive breach between the democratic elements of Bata-
vian radicalism on the one side, and their focus on rationalizing and unifying the state from
above on the other. After the coup, the Neighborhood Councils were purged of supporters
of the moderates, only to be relegated a mere secondary role in the process of reforming
the state. Their task was confined to executing decisions taken by the new directorate.
Increasingly distrustful of its own popular base, the radical regime, in which Pieter
Vreede played a leading role, quelled local revolts and dismantled popular committees
and revolutionary societies.86
Conclusion
The authoritarian turn of the radical leaders after 22 January 1798 has often led later his-
torians to off-handedly dismiss their democratic pretensions of the years before.87
However, to read the intentions of the radicals backwards in this way leads to conclusions
that are one-sided at best, and more often are plainly mistaken about the complex inter-
play between revolutionary dynamics at the local and the national level. Instead, this
article proposes to see the changing approach to the relationship between democracy
and the struggle against federalism among leading Batavian radicals as the outcome of
a very real clash between the ideal of radical and democratic unification on the one
side, and the localized nature of radical popular mobilization on the other. This political
problem reflected wider tensions between the sweeping success of the ideal of the
national state as it was envisioned in the new French constitutions on the one hand,
and on the other hand the strong traditions of revolt focused on the defense of local
autonomy.
This article has suggested that the difficulties that radical Batavians experienced in
advancing their ideals of a democratic national state at least in part resulted from the
fact that among their own rank and file support base, patterns of mobilization remained
highly localized. When faced with determined conservative resistance, the radicals them-
selves reframed their struggle in terms of the defense of ancient local rights. In this, they
were not unique. The Leiden events form a microscopic example of the often contradic-
tory relationship between popular struggles to defend local autonomy and the visions
of a strong and unified state among revolutionary elites that, in different and often
more significant forms emerged in all the key struggles of the Age of Revolutions.
Pierre Serna has suggested that all revolutions contain important elements of a war of
independence. However, seen from the height of the national state, the ultimate aim of
revolutionizing the existing state apparatus was often the far-reaching subjection of for-
mally autonomous regions or polities. Popular democratic movements took shape
within this contradictory force-field.
The Leiden initiative of January 1797 was significant for what it represented, as well as
for the relative ease with which it was swept aside. As the article has shown, the idea that
popular assemblies elected directly through the lowest rungs of the electoral system could
function as driving force for the revolution, was deeply seated in the radical interpretation
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of the nature of representative democracy itself. As such, it was connected to the attempts
that started immediately after the installation of the Batavian Republic to extend (male)
suffrage to the widest possible layer of people, and to counter the moderate and federalist
wing of Batavian democracy at the local and the national level. During the first years of the
revolution, radical societies, neighborhood councils and lower-class constituencies often
coordinated their actions to further their demands. However, most of the time such coordi-
nation remained highly localized. The Leiden call for a nation-wide assembly was a serious
attempt to muster these same forces on a supra-regional level, in order to change the
course of the revolution itself. The ease with which the provincial authorities suppressed
this attempt, as well as the success of moderates at the municipal level in diverting protest
against this suppression in the direction of the politically more limited demand of the
defense of local autonomy, lays bare one of the structural weaknesses of Batavian
radicalism.
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